



In a recent article in the pages of this Journal,' Professor Abbe Gluck
highlights an important phenomenon: federal courts do not generally apply
state interpretive methodologies when construing state statutes. Gluck argues
forcefully that this practice is incorrect as a doctrinal matter under Erie, and
that the legal academy's failure to examine statutory interpretation from a self-
consciously "intersystemic" perspective represents a significant gap in the
literature.'
In this Comment, I extend Gluck's argument regarding the inconsistent
and undertheorized nature of the federal approach to intersystemic statutory
interpretation to a new context: federal courts' interpretation of the statutory
law of foreign countries' in the course of transnational litigation.' I argue that
1. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011).
2. Gluck suggests that in the domestic statutory interpretation context, "[n]either the federal
nor the state courts have any consistent or well-articulated approach to the question of
whether they are required to apply one another's interpretive methodologies to one
another's statutes" and "[w]hat's more, this phenomenon has gone mostly unnoticed, or no
one seems to care." Id. at 1901.
3. Throughout this Comment, I use the term "foreign law" to refer to the law of a foreign
country, not (as is sometimes done in the domestic conflicts literature) the law of a non-
forum U.S. state. For a typology of domestic courts' uses of foreign law, and for background
on the role of foreign law in transnational litigation, see Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign
Law in Domestic Courts: Different Uses, Different Implications, in GLOBALIZING JUSTICE:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND THE CRoss-BORDER MIGRATION OF
LEGAL NoRMS 45 (Donald W. Jackson, Michael C. Tolley & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 2010).
4. In the transnational context, an intersystemic perspective on statutory interpretation has
also generally been absent from the literature. For exceptions to this general rule, see
Andrew N. Adler, Translating & Interpreting Foreign Statutes, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 37 (1997);
and Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
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when federal courts are called upon to interpret foreign statutes, they should
make greater efforts to employ the interpretive approaches of the relevant
foreign jurisdictions. This is particularly important because a number of
foreign countries-like certain U.S. states,s but unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court-accord the status of law (or, at least, law-like status) to methodologies
of statutory interpretation. The practice of federal courts in this respect has
been inconsistent, often disregarding key aspects of foreign interpretive
methodology. Judicial practice is thus in tension with the policies that militate
in favor of the use of foreign law in transnational litigation.'
I. FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS: CURRENT PRACTICE
Amid the globalizing forces of the world economy, federal courts are often
called upon to apply and to interpret the laws of foreign countries.7 A court
sitting in diversity might apply a state choice-of-law rule that requires the court
to apply the tort law of a foreign nation. In a contract dispute, a federal court
might apply foreign substantive law pursuant to an international agreement's
choice-of-law clause.9 In the realm of corporate law, a court might find, based
on an application of the internal affairs doctrine,"o that a foreign nation's
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L.
31, 43-44 (2011), which proposes a "simple" versus "contextualized" dichotomy in foreign
law determination analogous to Roscoe Pound's "law in books" versus "law in action"
paradigm.
5. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993)
(establishing a standard methodological framework for statutory interpretation in Oregon);
see also Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation Methodology as "Law": Oregon's Path-Breaking
Interpretive Framework and Its Lessons for the Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 540 (2011)
(discussing the Portland General Electric framework).
6. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
7. See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination ofForeign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening
the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 893-95 (2011).
8. See, e.g., McGee v. Arkel Int'l, LLC, 671 F-3d 539 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Louisiana choice-
of-law rules to determine that Iraqi tort law governed a wrongful death suit brought by the
Texas-resident parents of a U.S. servicemember killed in Iraq due to the alleged negligence
of a Louisiana-domiciled government contractor).
9. See, e.g., Medline Indus. Inc. v. Maersk Med. Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(finding that English law governs a breach of contract claim, pursuant to Illinois state
choice-of-law rules governing the application of choice-of-law clauses in contracts).
lo. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971); see also Frederick
Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CoRP. L. 33 (20o6)
(providing background on and discussing the history of the internal affairs doctrine).
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procedural requirements govern a shareholder derivative suit." Even the direct
application of certain federal statutes may require U.S. courts to interpret
foreign law: for example, under the anti-bribery Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act," a defendant may present the affirmative defense that an allegedly
improper payment to a foreign official was "lawful under the written laws and
regulations of the foreign official's ... country." A federal court might also be
called upon to review federal agencies' interpretations of foreign law in the
context of administrative adjudication." As a general matter, various policy
arguments militating in favor of applying foreign law in litigation in domestic
forums have been advanced, including international comity,15 reciprocity,'"
predictability," fairness,'" and discouragement of forum shopping. 9
In the United States, the process by which federal courts interpret foreign
law is set out in Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
ii. See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Derivative Litig., 507 F. Supp. 2d 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that
English law governed whether a shareholder had standing to bring a derivative suit on
behalf of a U.K.-domiciled firm).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-i to -3, 78ff (2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. 5 78dd-2(c)(i).
14. See, e.g., Kaho v. Ilchert, 765 F.2d 877 ( 9th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court's reversal
of a decision by the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals on the basis of an erroneous
interpretation of the law of customary adoption in the Kingdom of Tonga).
is. On comity generally, see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1991).
i6. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 688 (4 th ed. 2007) ("One reason that U.S. courts should respect the
sovereignty of foreign states [by applying foreign law] . . . is to increase the prospects that
foreign states will respect U.S. sovereignty.").
17. See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAwS 4 (1935) ("International
trade could not be carried on as has now become necessary unless the trader could be
assured that he would not be placed absolutely at the mercy of the vagaries or unknown
requirements of the local law, but would find a well-established body of law to protect his
rights.").
is. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit CO., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("For another jurisdiction,
if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather
than those of the place where he did the acts . . . would be unjust . . . ").
ig. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 16, at 689-90 ("[M]ost . . . choice of law rules .. . seek to
ensure that different jurisdictions will apply the same substantive law to the same dispute.
This reduces the risk of 'forum shopping' . . . ."); accord Giesela Riihl, Methods and
Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 8oi, 807-16
(2006) ("Essentially four [economic] arguments can be made [for applying foreign law
rather than the law of the forum]: first, application of foreign law enhances pre-litigation
predictability, second, it discourages forum shopping, third, it promotes regulatory
competition, and fourth, it preserves the comparative regulatory advantage of foreign
jurisdictions.").
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A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country's
law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In
determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The court's determination must be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.20
Under the current procedural regime, which in some respects parallels the
"all available data" test employed by federal courts when interpreting state law
in the Erie context," judges called upon to interpret foreign statutes have relied
on a wide variety of sources. These sources have included foreign statutory
text,22 foreign case law," and secondary materials. 4 In contrast to the state law
determination process, however, expert testimony has also been a widely
employed method of determining the content of foreign law; indeed, many
courts regard expert testimony as the primary method for understanding
foreign law." In addition to basing a determination on the pleadings and
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. An analogous rule exists for foreign law determinations in the criminal
context. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1. For a discussion of the history of the processes of foreign
law determination, see Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to
Determining Foreign Law: Death Knellfor a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1967).
21. On the "all available data" test generally, see Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule ofLaw,
42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 697-702 (1995). The fact that the foreign law determination process
largely parallels the process of determining state law under Erie is appropriate given the
history and purpose of Rule 44.1. See Doug M. Keller, Comment, Interpreting Foreign Law
Through an Erie Lens: A Critical Look at United States v. McNab, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 157, 179
(2004) (suggesting that because the "purpose of [the current rules governing foreign law
determination] was to make determining foreign law as similar to domestic law as possible,"
the rules should be read to require courts to attempt an "Erie guess" when applying foreign
law); see also Wilson, supra note 7, at 906 ("[T]he adoption of Rule 44.1 was designed-to
the extent possible -to make the process of determining foreign law mirror the method of
ascertaining domestic law.").
22. See, e.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 73-76 (D.D.C. 20o) (citing ii
OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 376 (2d ed. j989)) (construing an Israeli penal statute based
in part on the Oxford English Dictionary definition of a word used in the court's translated
copy of the Israeli law).
23. See, e.g., Aasma v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n, 95 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1996)
(referencing case law construing a U.K. statute).
24. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592, 602 (5th Cir. 1970) (relying in part on an
"authoritative treatise on Belgium law"); Bonsu v. Holder, 646 F. Supp. 2d 273, 279-80 (D.
Conn. 2009) (citing an article on Ghanaian law in a quarterly publication of the American
Bar Association).
25. See Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 459 (3d Cit. 1999)




evidence presented by the parties to the litigation, a court may also determine a
question of foreign law on the basis of its own research (although it is not
required to do so under Rule 44.1)."
II. TRANSNATIONAL INTERSYSTEMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When federal courts are called upon to construe foreign statutes, they
employ highly inconsistent interpretive practices. Just as some federal courts in
the domestic Erie context seek to pair state statutes with the relevant state
interpretive methodologies, 7 some federal courts have made clear efforts to
adhere to the interpretive rules of the relevant foreign jurisdiction. 8 At other
times, however, courts appear simply to twin the text of a foreign statute with
the principles of statutory interpretation commonly relied on by federal courts
when interpreting domestic law.
For example, in United States v. Mitchell,29 the Fourth Circuit noted that it
"ha[d] drawn upon the canons of statutory construction with which we
interpret our own laws"3o in order to interpret Pakistani legislation. One later
Arbitration Between Trans Chem. Ltd. & China Nat'1 Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F.
Supp. 266, 275 (S.D. Tex. 1997))). For examples of the use of expert testimony in foreign
law determination, see Thorsteinsson v. M/V Drangur, 891 F.2d 1547, 1549 (tith Cit. 1990),
which relies on the testimony of an Icelandic attorney; Ramsay, 432 F.2d at 600-03, which
relies on the testimony of two Belgian law experts; and Rice Corp. v. Grain Board of Iraq, 582
F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1312 (E.D. Cal. 2oo8), which relies on the testimony of an official at the
Iraqi Ministry of Justice.
26. See, e.g., Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1998). The duality inherent in Rule
44.-in any given case, the relevant foreign law might have to be pled, or it might not,
subject to the discretion of the court-has been sharply criticized by one commentator as
"conceptually incoherent," particularly given the heightened pleading standards of Iqbal and
Twombly. Roger M. Michalski, Pleading and Proving Foreign Law in the Age of Plausibility
Pleading, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1207, 1215 (2011).
27. See, e.g., In re W. Iowa Limestone, Inc., 538 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 2008); In re Whitaker
Constr. Co., 439 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cit. 2006); Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1248 (ioth Cir.
2005).
28. See, e.g., United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367,
1380 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting the suggestion that the court "import[] American principles
of statutory construction into the analysis" of Honduran law). In a notable example of
proactive engagement with codified foreign interpretive principles, a federal bankruptcy
court recently relied on the interpretive approaches codified in the Acts Interpretation Act 19o
(Cth) s 15AB(2)(e) (Austl.), to justify referencing an Australian statute's explanatory
memorandum because "[p]ursuant to statutory authority, Australian courts may use ...
explanatory memoranda to interpret legislation." In re Betcorp Ltd., 40o B.R. 266, 282
(Bankr. D. Nev. 2009).
29. 985 F.2d 1275 (4 th Cit. 1993).
30. Id. at 1281.
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court, called upon to construe Chinese law, has described Mitchell as standing
for the blanket proposition that "in making [a] foreign law determination,
[the] court may draw upon the canons of statutory interpretation with which
U.S. courts interpret American laws."' Courts may sometimes assume that no
concession need be made to foreign interpretive practice: one authority
suggests that "[i]f the issue is the law of England, for example, American
judges have little difficulty reading English statutes and cases .... [T]he law of
England may sometimes be treated like the law of an American sister state.""
Such practices, however, risk neglecting the case law -and, in many cases, the
codified interpretive rules - that guides foreign courts in the process of
statutory interpretation.
In Anglo American Insurance Group, P.L. C. v. CalFed, Inc.,4 the court was
called upon to determine whether a U.K. statutes permitted the
indemnification of corporate officers against claims from third parties. In
CalFed, the court (citing Second Circuit doctrine from the Erie-Klaxon" line of
cases that was developed in the context of domestic conflicts of law) concluded
that "[w]here the issue of foreign law has not been addressed by the courts of
the foreign jurisdiction,... a federal court must engage in the two-step process
31. United States v. Xu, No. 202-CR-oo6 74PMPLRL, 20o8 WL 1315632, at *3 (D. Nev. Apr. io,
20o8).
32. Comm. on Int'l Commercial Disputes, Proof ofForeign Law After Four Decades with Rule 44.1
FRCP and CPLR 4511, 61 REc. Ass'N BAR CITY N.Y. 49, 56 (2oo6).
33. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1847 n.363 (2010) (noting
that some of the "[h]ighest courts in other countries ... have implemented controlling
interpretive regimes"); see also GohYihan, A Comparative Account of Statutory Interpretation in
Singapore, 29 STATUTE L. REV. 195 (2008) (discussing regimes of interpretive methodology
established by statute in Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand). In the Republic of
Ireland, section 5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 (Act No. 23/2005) (Ir.), http://www
.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2005/en.act.2005.o023.pdf, codifies a version of the plain meaning
rule. In Canada, the purposivist "modern principle" approach to statutory interpretation has
been adopted as the preferred approach of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Rizzo & Rizzo
Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (Can.) (citing RUTH SuLUvAN, DRIEDGER ON THE
CONsTRUcTION OF STATUTES (3d ed. 1994)); see also Stiphane Beaulac & Pierre-Andr6 Ct6,
Driedger's "Modern Principle" at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, justification,
Legitimization, 40 REVUE JURIDIQUE THtMIS 131, 154 (20o6) (discussing the widespread
acceptance of the "modern principle").
34. 899 F. Supp. 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
3s. Specifically, section 310 of The Companies Act, 1985, c. 6 (U.K.).
36. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Supreme Court
concluded that the Erie "prohibition . . . against ... independent determinations by the
federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws." Id. at 496. In other words, a federal
court sitting in diversity is required to treat state choice-of-law rules as substantive for the




of determining what the courts of the forum state would predict that the courts
of the foreign jurisdiction would find."" The federal court must, in other
words, predict the forum state's prediction as to the meaning of the foreign
law.,
In the United Kingdom, a longstanding exclusionary rule barred citation to
legislative history for the purposes of statutory interpretation prior to 1992.'9
In that year, the House of Lords case of Pepper v. Hart4o carved out a limited
exception to this rule for the purposes of statements made by ministers that
"clearly disclose[] the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying
behind . . . ambiguous or obscure words."4' In interpreting the U.K. statute,
however, the CalFed court began by citing both a 1983 (pre-Pepper) edition of
an English treatise and a U.S. Supreme Court opinion for the proposition that
"[t]he first source for interpretation of a statute is the words of the statute
itself."" The court then rejected several textual and structural arguments,
adverting instead to extrinsic aids to interpretation, including nonenactment
legislative history and the statements of backbench Members of Parliament.3
Moreover, the court made no mention of the threshold requirements for
37. CalFed, 899 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 n.10 (2d Cir.
1989)).
3s. Cf Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), vacated on other grounds,
365 U.S. 293 (1961) ("Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine
what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about
which neither has thought.").
3g. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42 (H.L.) 60 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) (appeal taken
from Eng.) ("Under present law, there is a general rule that reference[] to Parliamentary
material as an aid to statutory construction is not permissible."); see also Scott C. Styles, The
Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation Afier Pepper v Hart, 14 O.J.L.S. 151, 151 (1994)
(describing "[t]he 'exclusionary rule"' as "one of the best established of our rules of
statutory interpretation" before Pepper).
40. 1 All E.R. 42.
41. Id. at 64; see also Styles, supra note 39, at 151 ("In Pepper the Court laid down a clear and
strict rule" that "it is only ministerial statements which clearly disclose the mischief at which
the legislation is aimed which may be cited.").
42. CalFed, 899 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312
(1983); 44 HALSBURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 857 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone ed., 4th
ed. 1983)). The court, by citing both to foreign and forum statutory interpretation
principles, mirrored the approach that federal courts often take when construing state
statutes. But see Gluck, supra note 1, at 1933 (noting that "[flrom a doctrinal perspective, this
practice of citing state and federal cases together is confusing" and suggesting that "[fjederal
courts that follow this practice appear either to view the rules as universal or to feel the need
to buttress their state methodological choices with federal authority-or perhaps are just
uncertain about which court's rules apply").
43. CalFed, 899 F. Supp. at 1078-80.
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employing legislative history established in Pepper v. Hart.4 The court thus
arguably reflected the longstanding' liberal approach of many American courts
to using extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation, and not the cautious
approach of the English courts.
Why might courts be disregarding foreign statutory interpretation
methodologies? First, courts could be making a conscious choice to eschew
greater engagement with foreign interpretive methods. Such a decision might
be taken in the interests of efficiency,** or might reflect an intuition that
principles of statutory interpretation have a universal character.4 1 Indeed,
courts might not view interpretive methodology as "law" within the meaning
of Rule 44.1 at all. However, while such a view might reflect the current
unsettled legal status of some aspects of federal interpretive methodology,45 it
44. See id.; supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
45. The standard account is that the American judicial practice of relying on legislative history
essentially began in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History
and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, so STAN. L.
REV. 1833, 1835 (1998) (asserting that the 1892 case of "Holy Trinity ... overturn[ed] the
traditional rule that barred judicial recourse to internal legislative history"). It is worth
noting, however, that this oft-repeated narrative is not an accurate reflection of the history
of interpretive practice in America's state courts: in fact, a number of state courts were
enthusiastically relying on forms of legislative history as early as the antebellum period. See,
e.g., People v. Brenham, 3 Cal. 477, 490 (1851) (Murray, J., concurring) ("[C]onsidering that
the construction of this section is doubtful, there is no better way of arriving at the intention
of the legislature than by consulting the legislative history of the bill."); People v. Tyler, 7
Mich. 161, 217 (18S9) (relying on the fact that a bill was "passed without any examination or
debate" to conclude that a narrow interpretation of the statute was correct, in an early
example of what would more than a century later come to be known as the "dog that did not
bark" canon).
46. It could, for example, reflect a sense that foreign interpretive practices are simply
unknowable, at least at reasonable cost. Cf Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, 817 F.
Supp. 1338, 1352 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("There is no telling what the canons of statutory
construction were in the former Soviet Union. There is also no telling what they are in the
Republic of Kazakhstan.").
47. Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, i776-18o6, 1o1 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1036-38 (2001) (discussing the
historical conception of statutory interpretation methodology).
48. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872-77 (2008); Gluck, supra note 1, at 1909 ("The U.S.
Supreme Court seems to accept, and perhaps prefers, the unresolved legal status of federal
statutory interpretation methodology."); see also Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in
Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1727, 1766 (2010) (characterizing the canons as
"flexible rules of thumb . . . rather than binding rules"); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note,




would not comport with the status accorded interpretive methodology in some
foreign countries. In fact, a number of foreign countries have- either through
codification or through case law-established controlling regimes of statutory
interpretation.4 ' These regimes, where they exist, should be seen as integral to
the meaning of foreign statutory text. Indeed, it is possible that statutory
interpretation methodology could be "law" for the purposes of the foreign law
determination process (because it is accorded law-like status in the foreign
jurisdiction), even if it were not "law" in the domestic Erie context.
Alternatively, courts might prefer to apply foreign interpretive
methodologies to foreign statutes but find themselves unable to do so, perhaps
because the parties have not sufficiently pleaded interpretive methodologies.
Under traditional conflict-of-law principles, if a party insufficiently pleads
foreign law, the judge may, as one court notes, "look to its own forum's law in
order to fill in any gaps."50
Irrespective of the reasons for this practice, courts should-at the very
least-more explicitly justify decisions to pair foreign statutory text with
traditional American principles of statutory interpretation. This is particularly
important because the factors that justify the use of foreign law in
transnational litigation in the first place-comity, predictability, fairness, and
the avoidance of forum shopping- similarly militate in favor of interpreting
the relevant law as it would have been interpreted in the foreign jurisdiction."
CONCLUSION
Recently, the practice by many trial courts of relying on expert testimony
when determining foreign law has been the subject of increasingly sharp
criticism. In a 2oo9 case, for example, Judge Posner decried the practice of
"[r]elying on paid witnesses to spoon feed judges" in foreign law cases.s2 He
developed this critique further in the 2010 case of Bodum USA, Inc. v. La
io8 COLUM. L. REv. 681, 682 (20o8) ("The pervasive sentiment is that decisions about
judicial methodology are left to the discretion of the individual Justice.").
49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
so. Banco de Credito Indus., S.A. v. Tesoreria Gen., 990 F.2d 827, 836 (5th Cir. 1993).
51. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; Cf 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 37:5, at 143-44 (7th ed. 2009) (noting
that "the rules of the state in which the statute was enacted should be followed if they have
been pleaded and proved" and that "[b]y applying those rules of construction, decisions are
more likely to achieve uniformity in the application of statutory law and avoid some of the
uncertainties entailed by foreign actions").
52. Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., S86 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Cafetiere, Inc." Concurring with an opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook
(which also criticized, albeit more gently, the use of foreign-law experts),
Judge Posner highlighted the risks of biased expert testimony and the
responsibilities of judges-who are, after all, "experts on law"s4-to determine
questions of law themselves.
Although the call for judges to conduct more independent research into
foreign law is surely a laudable one, there are significant risks in eschewing
expert testimony on foreign law questions. As one author has noted, "when
U.S. judges . . . resort to independent research, they often mistakenly tend to
perceive foreign law as quite similar to domestic law, and they tend to give
naive 'plain' meanings to foreign provisions."ss The risk of falsely analogizing
foreign interpretive practices to those of the United States is particularly
pronounced given that, in many respects, the scholarly conversation at the
intersection of statutory interpretation theory and comparative law remains
limited." Consequently, in many cases, the relevant information regarding the
foreign country's interpretive regime may not be accessible to a domestic court
absent foreign experts who have been socialized into the legal profession of the
country in question, even when the foreign legal system might seem similar to
that of the United States. Although imperfect, expert testimony -particularly if
focused on the "how" question of the foreign interpretive approach in addition
to the "what" question of the foreign substantive law content -can give courts
a window into a foreign jurisdiction's controlling interpretive regime in a way
that statutory text or secondary sources simply cannot.
Finally, a possible incidental benefit of a more sensitive approach to foreign
interpretive methodology deserves special comment. Just as treating state
interpretive methodology as "law" in the Erie context might further the process
of "dialectical federalism," as Gluck suggests," so might a greater focus on
53. 621 F-3d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Adler, supra note 4, at 39, 63-66.
56. See Daniel A. Farber, The Hermeneutic Tourist: Statutory Interpretation in Comparative
Perspective, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 513, 515 (1996) (noting that the scholarly "literature on
statutory interpretation has been quite parochial"); Holger Fleischer, Comparative
Approaches to the Use ofLegislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 6o AM. J. CoMP. L. 401,
402 (2012) (noting that "most of the literature on the subject still treats interpretative
methodology as a solely national field of study" (emphasis omitted)). For important
exceptions, see INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative
History Usage by the House ofLords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); and
Fleischer, supra.
57. Gluck, supra note 1, at 1991-95 (highlighting potential benefits of a "conversation between




foreign interpretive methodology in the foreign law determination context
foster transnational judicial dialogue.'" In the words of one author, exposure to
foreign interpretive approaches "cannot help but expand the imaginative space
open to us when we contemplate our own legal system." 9 If U.S. courts were
to place greater emphasis on pairing foreign statutory texts with those texts'
associated interpretative methodologies, the resulting sensitivity to alternative
interpretive approaches might well come to influence the evolution even of
domestic statutory interpretation doctrine. The benefits accruing from a more
vibrant "dialogue between the adjudicative bodies of the world community"o
6,on such issues could be significant.
NICHOLAS M. MCLEAN
"dialectical federalism" generally, see Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
58. On the concept of transnational judicial dialogue generally, see, for example, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (1999). The transnational "dialogue"
concept has been the subject of a large scholarly literature in the field of constitutional law,
but has drawn significantly less attention in the context of statutory interpretation.
s9. Farber, supra note 56, at 521-22.
6o. Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F. 3d 1o95, 11o (2d Cit. 1995).
61. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, "PARTLY LAws COMMON TO ALL MANKIND": FOREIGN LAW
IN AMERICAN COURTS 76-1o8 (2012) (arguing that engagement with foreign jurisprudence
enables courts to learn from foreign experience with similar legal issues). As Waldron notes,
"to ignore foreign solutions or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign
betokens not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the
problems we face." Id. at 103.
* The author would like to extend special thanks to Judge Guido Calabresi, Professor Abbe
Gluck, and Professor Nicholas Parrillo for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
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